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ABSTRACT
The persistence of racial inequality in the U.S. labor market against
a general backdrop of formal equality of opportunity is a trou-
bling phenomenon that has significant ramifications on the design
of hiring policies. In this paper, we show that current group dis-
parate outcomes may be immovable even when hiring decisions are
bound by an input-output notion of “individual fairness.” Instead,
we construct a dynamic reputational model of the labor market that
illustrates the reinforcing nature of asymmetric outcomes result-
ing from groups’ divergent accesses to resources and as a result,
investment choices. To address these disparities, we adopt a dual
labor market composed of a Temporary Labor Market (TLM), in
which firms’ hiring strategies are constrained to ensure statistical
parity of workers granted entry into the pipeline, and a Permanent
Labor Market (PLM), in which firms hire top performers as desired.
Individual worker reputations produce externalities for their group;
the corresponding feedback loop raises the collective reputation of
the initially disadvantaged group via a TLM fairness intervention
that need not be permanent. We show that such a restriction on
hiring practices induces an equilibrium that, under particular mar-
ket conditions, Pareto-dominates those arising from strategies that
statistically discriminate or employ a “group-blind” criterion. The
enduring nature of equilibria that are both inequitable and Pareto
suboptimal suggests that fairness interventions beyond procedural
checks of hiring decisions will be of critical importance in a world
where machines play a greater role in the employment process.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As algorithms are increasingly deployed to make social decisions
that have previously been under the sole purview of humans, a
growing body of work has challenged the reigning primacy of op-
timality and efficiency when issues of bias and discrimination are
potentially at stake. Research in the growing field of algorithmic
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fairness has sought to address these concerns about the machine
decision-making process by examining and manipulating standard
tasks such as ranking or classification under generalized constraints
of “fairness.” Such computational notions of fairness have been var-
ied but two broad opposing perspectives have proposed solutions
that either defend fairness at the individual level (similar individ-
uals are treated similarly) [1] or at the group level (groups are
awarded proportional representation) [2, 3]. While this paper sim-
ilarly adopts a constraint-based intervention to achieve fairness,
we depart from standard accounts of fairness that consider static
domain-general algorithms and instead develop a dynamic model
for the specific domain of decision-making in the labor market.
Our work considers the role that firms’ hiring practices play in
perpetuating economic inequalities between social groups by way
of the disparate outcomes that groups experience in their employ-
ment opportunities and wage prospects. We address the issue by
building upon a dynamic model of worker and firm behavior that
has been shown to generate the asymmetric group outcomes that
are observed empirically between black and white workers in the
United States [9–11] and appending a constraint on firms’ hiring
practices that successfully induces a group-equitable equilibrium.
As we focus on the particular domain of labor market dynamics,
our paper draws upon an extensive literature in economics. The
theory of statistical discrimination, originally set forth in two semi-
nal papers by Phelps [4] and Arrow [5], explains disparate group
outcomes as the result of rational agent behaviors that lock a system
into an unfavorable equilibrium. In the basic model, workers com-
pete for a skilled job with wagew . Skill acquisition requires workers
to expend an investment cost of c , which is distributed according
to a function F . A worker’s investment decision is an assessment of
her expected wage gain compared with her investment cost. Firms
seek information about a worker’s hidden ability level but can only
base hiring decisions on observable attributes: her noisy investment
signal and group membership. The firm’s response to this miss-
ing information problem is to update its beliefs about a worker’s
qualifications by drawing on its prior for her group’s ability lev-
els. Therefore if a firm holds different priors for different groups,
it will also set different group-specific hiring thresholds. Further,
since these distinct thresholds are observed and internalized by
workers, they adjust their own investment strategies accordingly—
individuals within the unfavored group will lower their investment
levels, and individuals in the favored group will continue to invest
at a high level. Notably, even when the distribution of investment
costs F is the same for each group1, an asymmetric equilibrium
can arise in which groups invest at different levels, further inform-
ing firms’ distinct priors and reinforcing disparate employment
1This has been the standard assumption in the economics literature since Arrow [5].
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prospects. In other words, rational workers and firms best respond
in ways that exactly confirm the others’ beliefs and strategies, and
thus, the discriminatory outcome is “justified.”
A proponent of “individual fairness” may diagnose the prob-
lem of statistical discrimination as a failure to treat candidates of
similar investments similarly2. After all, the mistaken inference of
unequal group ability levels indeed appears to be the origin of firms’
inequitable hiring decisions. Moreover, when investment level is
positively correlated with likelihood of being qualified, hiring based
solely on investments is both rational and individually-fair. How-
ever, this group-blind solution fails to take into account a critical
aspect of workers’ investments—namely that they are choices rather
than givens. Failure to recognize the upstream causes of observed
data features brings to light the prickly notion of “ground truth” that
has, from the start, plagued work on machine learning bias. Within
a system as complex as the labor market, an input-output account
of fairness that assesses the mapping of workers’ investment levels
to their hiring outcomes does not resolve the underlying source of
inequalities that drives the differences in attributes between groups.
Because both statistical discrimination and machine learning rely
on data that harbor historical inequalities, local fairness checks are
often incapable of addressing the self-perpetuating nature of biases.
Even without group biases, the paradox remains: the cyclic equi-
librium ensures local procedural fairness—fairness with respect to
investment choices—while maintaining global disparate outcomes.
The difficulty in pinpointing a particular cause of observed
system-wide asymmetric outcomes challenges our mission in de-
signing constraints to ensure fairness within the domain. If the
outcomes themselves are trapped in a feedback loop, a successful
fairness constraint should first jolt the system out of its current
steady-state, and second, launch it on a path towards a preferable
equilibrium. As such, a successful approach must consider fairness
in situ. This paper presents a domain-specific dynamic model with
an intervention that effects system-wide impact, guaranteeing a
group-equitable equilibrium that is stable and self-sustaining.
In our model, workers invest in human capital, enter first a Tem-
porary Labor Market (TLM) and then transition into a Permanent
Labor Market (PLM)3. We use this partition to impose a constraint
on TLM hiring practices that enforces group statistical parity rep-
resentation. However, the restriction need not apply in the PLM
where firms select natural best response hiring strategies. Our em-
ployment model is reputational—a worker carries an individual
reputation, which is a summary of her past job performances and
belongs to a group with a collective reputation, which is a measure
of the proportion of its members producing “good” outcomes.
Working within this model, we show that by imposing this con-
straint on firms’ hiring strategies in the TLM, the resulting steady-
state in the PLM is symmetric such that an equal proportion of
2In the exposition of “individual fairness” proposed by Dwork et al. [1], the built-in
flexibility of the generic similarity metric between persons can include group member-
ship and even be used to justify “fair affirmative action.” However, within an economic
signaling environment where firms’ hiring standards affect workers’ investments, a
more flexible metric approach that compares quality within and across groups still
fails to account for the strategy and incentive features of the labor market and thus the
group coordination failure that characterizes many statistical discrimination equilibria.
3Contracting in a segmented market is common in the labor economics literature. Of
these, our work is most similar to Kim & Loury [6], but notably they model the effects
of statistical discrimination, while ours explicitly requires group-equitable outcomes.
workers in the two groups produce good outcomes and are thus
hired. The labor market at equilibrium, both procedurally and in
outcomes, satisfies leading notions of “fairness”–group, individual,
meritocratic [1, 3? ]—discussed in the algorithmic fairness liter-
ature. Furthermore, we show that under particular labor market
conditions, it Pareto-dominates the asymmetric outcomes that arise
under two unconstrained rational hiring strategies: group-blind hir-
ing and statistical discriminatory hiring. Our fairness intervention
exploits the complementary nature of individual and collective rep-
utations such that the system produces its own feedback loop that
incrementally addresses initial inequalities in group social standing.
As such, the TLM intervention need not be permanent—statistical
parity of hired workers becomes the natural result of firms’ optimal
hiring strategies once group equality is restored and the fairness
constraint becomes obsolete.
This paper’s constraint-based approach to achieving equitable
group outcomes in a reputational model of labormarket interactions
melds the perspectives and techniques of labor economics with the
motivations of algorithmic fairness. However, our system-wide view
also challenges a thread of work in the literature that characterizes
notions of fairness as input-output-based properties of a decision-
making function. By casting workers and firms as strategic agents
in a dynamic game, we incorporate complexities of the labor market
dynamic such as agents’ expectations, incentives, and externalities
that are otherwise difficult to encapsulate in a static classification
setting. We advocate for an intervention that addresses the root of
disparities between black and white workers’ positions in the labor
market and society—not only positions of unequal prospects and
outcomes but as important, positions of unequal opportunities and,
as a result, qualifications. Ensuring procedural fairness in the hiring
decision alone is insufficient for this greater task. Our proposed
constraint is designed to perturb a labor market at asymmetric
equilibrium by co-opting the system’s own cyclic effects to install
group-equality that is self-sustaining in the long-term.
In Section 2, we present a standard model of labor market dynam-
ics and introduce our fairness intervention. Section 3 contains an
overview of the equilibria results of the constrained-hiring model
along with a comparison against equilibria arising from two ratio-
nal hiring strategies free from such a constraint. The paper ends
with a reflection on the equilibrium tendencies of discrimination
and their implications on the design of fairness constraints. We
also offer some comments on the dynamic feedback effects that are
inherent features of persistent inequalities and the challenges they
issue upon future work in algorithmic fairness.
1.1 Related Work
Within the algorithmic fairness literature, Zemel et al. [7] address
group and individual notions of fairness by constructing a map-
ping of agent data to an intermediate layer of clusters that each
preserve statistical parity while obfuscating protected attributes. A
second map taking cluster assignments to their final classifications
then allows “similar” agents to be treated similarly. This dual-map
approach roughly corresponds to the roles of the TLM and PLM
in our model. Related work has sought distance metrics to guide
the initial mapping [1], but since criteria for similarity vary by
domain, general approaches often face obstacles of application. Our
paper’s concentrated treatment of labor market dynamics aims to
addresses this concern. We answer a call by Friedler et al. [8] to
specify a particular world view of fairness within a domain and
classification task. Our model starts with an assumption of inher-
ent equality between groups. As such, differences in observable
investment decisions or job outcomes are due to unequal societal
standing, producing secondary effects of inequality, rather than
fundamental differences in the nature of the individuals.
Labor market discrimination has been of long-standing inter-
est in economics due to the persistent inequalities in employment
prospects among groups of different race, gender, and other socially-
salient attributes [9–11]. Since most explicit forms of wage discrim-
ination are now illegal in the U.S. and genetic accounts of group
differences have been largely discredited [12], modern theories
of labor market discrimination have updated the classical works—
Becker’s “taste-based” discrimination [13] and Phelps’ model of
exogenous group productivity differences [4]—by examining the
social sources of asymmetric outcomes. Research in the field has
produced models that consider temporal dynamics, utilize distinct
group cost functions, and develop wages endogenously [14, 15]. We
follow in this line of work by incorporating a dynamic group reputa-
tion parameter into an individual’s cost function, a modeling choice
informed by the vast empirical literature showing the differential
externalities produced by groups of differential social standing. Our
model is not the first that makes explicit this linkage. In research
examining the impact of neighborhood segregation on agents’ ac-
cesses to resources for skill acquisition, Bowles, Loury, and Sethi
[16] include a group “skill share” metric that functions similarly to
our notion of group reputation in its effect on individuals’ costs.
This paper also frames the hiring process as reputational in na-
ture, following a distinct literature on collective reputation [17, 18].
Of these, our work shares most in common with the model pro-
posed by Levin [19], in which workers carry an individual reputa-
tion that contributes to their group’s reputation. Levin shows that
even when cost conditions evolve stochastically, reputations can
produce a persistent feedback effect that leads to convergence to
an asymmetric equilibrium in which groups occupy distinct social
standings. Unlike in Levin, the notion of collective reputation in
our model bears not only on workers’ forward-looking expecta-
tions and incentives but also explicitly impacts future generations’
investment costs. Additionally, since our work has in mind the
information-processing capabilities of artificial intelligence agents,
we formalize the concept of “individual reputation” as composed
of a total history of previous outcomes. These additional “data,”
while potentially overwhelming for human decision-makers, can
be handled by an algorithmic decision-maker. Since the functional-
ity of machine learning in the hiring process is ultimately based in
a form of “rational” statistical discrimination of worker data and job
histories, this strand of economics literature is particularly relevant
for considerations of algorithmic fairness in the labor market.
2 MODEL
We highlight the role of the fairness constraint within the rest of
the standard labor market dynamics of the model by utilizing a
dual labor market setup composed of a Temporary Labor Market
(TLM) and a Permanent Labor Market (PLM). In the former, a hiring
constraint is established to ensure statistical parity, and in the latter,
firms hire according to their best response hiring practices in a
reputational model applied to the particular setting of employment.
This partition does little to impinge upon the standard dynamics
of the labor market—workers flow from the TLM to the PLM, wages
are labor-market-wide, and individual worker reputations in the
PLM produce externalities for the collective group reputations that
play a key role in individuals’ pre-TLM investment decisions.
2.1 General Setup
Consider a society of n workers who pass through the labor market
sequentially at times t = 0, 1, .... The labor markets maintain a
constant relative size:m proportion of the workers reside in the
TLM, and 1−m reside in the PLM.Movement is governed by Poisson
processes—workers immediately replace departing ones in the TLM,
transition from the TLM to the PLM according to the parameter κ,
and leave the PLM at rate λ.
Each worker belongs to one of two groups µ ∈ {B,W } with
population share σB and 1 − σB respectively. We assume that these
subpopulation proportions of workers are stable such that a worker
of group µ who leaves the labor market is replaced via the birth
of a new worker of the same group. The distribution of individual
abilities, described by the CDF F (θ ), is stable over time and identical
across groups. In contrast, societal reputation varies with time and
by group. A group’s time t reputation π µt gives the proportion of
all individuals in group µ who are producing “good” outcomes in
the labor market, over the interval timespan [t − τ , t], where the
parameter τ ≥ 0 controls the time-lag effect of a group’s previous
generations’ performance on its present reputation.
Prior to entering the labor market, workers select education in-
vestment levels η, weighing the cost of investment with its expected
reward. Firms hire and pay workers based on expected performance,
awarding wagew(дt ) for a “good” worker, where дt gives the pro-
portion of “good” workers in the PLM at time t . To prevent constant
fluctuation at each time step, the wage wt = w(дt ′) updates in a
Poisson manner such that t ′ < t gives the time of the last wage
change. The hiring process is formalized by assigning workers to
either skilled or unskilled tasks with distinct wages. For simplicity,
workers who do not pass particular hiring thresholds may still be
considered “hired,” but they are assigned to an unskilled task and
paid a wage normalized to 0. As a function, the wage premiumwt
is decreasing in дt , since as the relative supply of “good” workers
increases, imperfect worker substitutability lowers their marginal
productivity, thus decreasing wage. We impose a minimum wage
¯
w such that limдt→∞w(дt ) = ¯w and a maximum wage w¯ suchthat limдt→0w(дt ) = w¯ . In the context of the model, minimum and
maximumwages should not be considered as only products of labor
laws, rather they also act to track the supply of “good” workers
relative to firms’ demand.
2.2 Temporary Labor Market
A worker i of group µ chooses to invest in human capital ηi ≥ 0
according to her expected wage gain of being in the skilled la-
bor market wt 4 and her personal cost function for investment,
4Workers are boundedly rational and unable to anticipate future wage dynamics.
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Figure 1: Timeline of worker and firm interactions through-
out the labor market pipeline.
cπ µt
(θi ,ηi ), which is a function decreasing in her individual abil-
ity θi and increasing in her selected level of investment ηi . The
incorporation of group reputation π µ into an individual’s cost func-
tion reflects the differential externalities produced by groups of
differential social standing [16]. We posit that a worker belong-
ing to a group with a superior societal reputation has improved
cost conditions relative to her counterparts with equal ability in
the lower reputation group. Formally, ∀π µt < πνt , cπ µt (θi ,ηi ) is a
positive monotonic transformation of cπ νt (θi ,ηi ).
Investment in human capital operates as an imperfect signal,
and workers have a hidden true type: qualified or unqualified,
ρ ∈ {Q,U }. Let γ : R≥0 → [0, 1] be a monotonically increasing
function that maps a worker’s investment level to her probability
of being qualified. Unlike in Spence’s original work on education
signaling [20] in which investment confers no productivity benefits
and thus operates purely as a signal to employers, in our model, a
worker’s chosen investment level η has intrinsic value insofar as it
is positively correlated with her likelihood of being qualified γ (η).
Given this setup, a firm’s TLM hiring strategy is a mappingHT :
R≥0
producttext1
µ → {0, 1} such that the hiring decision for worker i is
based only her observable investment level ηi ∈ R≥0 and group
membership µ. A worker who is hired into the TLM enters the
pipeline and is eligible to compete for a PLM skilled job; a worker
who does not pass the TLM hiring stage remains in the market but
is permanently excluded from candidacy for the skilled wage. In
this paper, we mainly consider only those workers who successfully
enter the skilled hiring pipeline, considering all others as “not hired.”
As such, we use the terms “skilled” and “hired” interchangeably.
2.3 Permanent Labor Market
Labor market dynamics follow in the style of repeated principal-
agent interactions with hidden actions (effort exertion) but observ-
able histories (reputation of outcomes). Once hired into the TLM, a
worker i exerts on-the-job effort—choosing either high (H ) or low (L)
effort—which stochastically produces an observable good (G) or bad
(B) outcome that affects her individual reputation and thus future
reward. Exerting L is free, but exerting H bears cost eρ (θi ), which
is a function of qualification ρ ∈ {Q,U } and ability level θi . Effort
is more costly for unqualified individuals: ∀θi , eU (θi ) > eQ (θi ). We
emphasize here that the notions of ability level θ and qualification
status ρ are distinct worker qualities. A high ability worker is one
who has the general attributes that bear on success in the realms of
education and work, whereas a qualified worker is one who has the
appropriate training and skills for a given job. We may say, very
crudely, that a worker is “born” with an ability level and “earns” a
qualification status. In our model, a worker’s ability level precedes
her investment decision, which begets a qualification status.
High effort increases the probability of a good outcomeG . If pρ,k
gives the probability of achieving outcome G with qualifications ρ
and effort level k , then the following inequalities hold.
pQ,H > pQ,L ;pU ,H > pU ,L ;pQ,L > pU ,L
Since the effect of qualifications on exerting high effort is already
incorporated in its cost, pQ,H = pU ,H , we write both quantities as
pH . We then simplify pQ,L and pU ,L to pQ and pU respectively.
We emphasize the distinction between the effort exertion cost
functions e(·) here and the previous investment cost functions c(·)—
the former are pertinent to workers already in the labor market and
differ by qualification status, whereas the latter relate to pre-labor-
market decisions and differ by group membership. Separate cost
functions allow for a finer analysis of the salient factors that influ-
ence agent behavior at distinct points of the labor market pipeline.
The inclusion of group membership into human-capital investment
costs reflects the genuine differences in resources available to work-
ers of different groups in their paths to education attainment5.
A worker keeps the same TLM job until the Poisson process
with parameter κ selects her to move into the PLM, where at each
time step, she cycles through jobs, exerting a chosen effort level,
producing an observable outcome, and accumulating a history of
past performances that includes her TLM outcome. At each time
step, firms in the PLM want to hire all and only those workers who
consistently exert effort. To do so, firms distill a worker’s history
of observable outcomes into her “individual reputation” Πti , which
gives the proportion of outcomes G in her recent length-t history.
In a labor market system of repeated worker-firm contracting, firms
have the power to use these observable individual reputations to
set self-enforcing relational contracts. A firm’s PLM hiring strategy
is a mappingHP : [0, 1] → {0, 1} such that the decision is solely a
function of Πti . Figure 1 depicts a timeline of how workers move
through the labor market pipeline and interact with firms.
While “fairness” is a notoriously thorny ethical concept to define,
the goal here of achieving long-term fairness is equivalent to attain-
ing group equality in labor market outcomes. Since groups do not
differ in fundamental or intrinsic ways, their job andwage prospects
should also not systematically diverge at a fair steady-state.
3 RESULTS
Reputation-based labor market models, such as the one described
in this paper, can generate asymmetric group outcomes when firms
utilize rational strategies such as statistical discrimination or group-
blind hiring [5, 14, 15, 21]. Since this paper examines the effect of our
proposed intervention on system-wide dynamics and outcomes,
in the following section, we consider only those strategies and
equilibria outcomes that arise in this fairness-constrained setting.
3.1 Equilibrium Strategies and Steady-States
We start by describing TLM strategies resulting from the fairness
constraint, thenmove onto the PLM and analyze firms’ andworkers’
best response strategies together. Gameplay in the PLM mirrors
5We do not claim that group membership ceases to be a relevant factor impacting
agent behavior once workers are in the labor market, but we note that a worker’s qual-
ifications, or the extent to which her skill investment proved to be successful, becomes
an overriding determinant. Insofar as education investment bears on qualification
status, a worker’s group membership continues to impact her labor market outcomes.
Table 1: Table of notation
Notation Significance
F (θ ) CDF of ability levels θ
π µ group µ reputation
σµ group µ population share
wt wage at time t
дµt
proportion of group µ workers
producing good outcomes at time t
η investment level
pH , pQ , pU probability of producing G given effort level
cπ µt
(θ, η) cost of investment
γ (η) probability of being qualified
ρ ∈ {Q, U } hidden qualification status
eρ (θ ) cost of effort exertion
Πti individual reputation at time t
repeated principal-agent interactions wherein firms have the power
to enforce contracts by monitoring individual reputations, and thus
we consider strategies that constitute a sequential equilibrium.
Since a firm in the TLM prefers candidates who are more likely
to be qualified, optimal hiring follows a threshold strategy: Given a
hiring threshold ηˆ, ∀i such that ηi ≥ ηˆ,HT (i) = 1, and inversely,
∀i such that ηi < ηˆ, HT (i) = 0. However, since firms must abide
by the statistical parity hiring rule, their optimal threshold strategy
is uniquely determined: if a firm aims to hire a fraction ℓ of all
workers, its investment thresholds will be implicitly defined and
group-specific, so that in the TLM, skilled employees from groups
µ and ν will constitute σµ ℓ and (1 − σµ )ℓ proportions of the full
worker population respectively.
A worker of group µ, observing her group-specific TLM invest-
ment threshold η̂µ , will weigh her cost of investment with her
expected wage gain wt . All workers i with cπ µt (θi , η̂µ ) ≤ wt will
choose to invest exactly at the level ηi = η̂µ and be hired for the
skilled position in the TLM; all other workers will invest at level
ηi = 0 and fail to enter the pipeline to compete for the skilled job.
Workers who pass the first hiring stage know that their future PLM
opportunities will depend on their observable outcome in the TLM,
and as such they exert effort in a one-shot game. A worker i with
qualification status ρ exerts high effort on the job if and only if
eρ (θi ) ≤ wt (pH − pρ ).
As previously shown, while the statistical parity constraint pre-
serves the fundamental equality of ability distributions F (θ ) be-
tween groups, the group-specific investment thresholds η̂µ gen-
erate group-specific investment strategies. As consequence, since
investment has positive returns on qualification status, groups may
have differing proportions of qualified candidates in the PLM pool.
We denote by γ µt the proportion of candidates in group µ who
are qualified at time t , leaving 1 − γ µt who are unqualified. Then
the proportion of group µ workers in the TLM who produce good
outcomes follows the recursive model
д
µ
t =pH [1 − F (θ̂Q )γ µt − F (θ̂U )(1 − γ µt )] + pQ F (θ̂Q )γ µt (1)
+ pU F (θ̂U )(1 − γ µt )
where θ̂ρ = e−1ρ (wt (pH − pρ ))
and дt ′ = σµ ℓд
µ
t ′ + (1 − σµ )ℓдνt ′
withwt = w(дt ′) where t ′ gives the time of the last wage update.
It is important to note that дµt gives the proportion of workers in
the skilled labor market who at time t are producing good outcomes
in their jobs. This quantity does not exactly coincide with group
reputation, π µt , which gives a (time-interval average) normalized
metric that scales with the proportion of all members in group
µ–including those who are not granted entry into the skilled job
pipeline–who are producing good outcomes.
A PLM worker’s future-anticipatory strategy is a selection of
time, reputation, wage, and hiring threshold-dependent probabil-
ities of effort exertion ϵ(Πt ′i ) with Πt
′
i ∈ {Πt
′} where the index i
of Πt ′i denotes a particular individual reputation level in the set of
all possible reputation levels {Π} and t ′ tracks the length of time
that has passed since the last wage update. Supposing that workers
engage in N -depth reasoning where N ≫ t ′, this quantity may be
computed via backward induction on the continuation value for a
given individual reputation, V (Πt ′i ). With this setup, the continua-
tion valueV (ΠN ) = 0, and the agent with ability θ and qualification
ρ solves the following dynamic programming problem
V (Πt ′i , Πˆt
′
,wt ) = sup
ϵ (Πt ′i )∈[0,1]
{
(1 − λ)[V (Πt ′+1i ,G)[ϵ(Πt
′
i )(pH − pρ ) + pρ ]+
V (Πt ′+1i ,B)[(1 − ϵ(Πt
′
i ))(pH − pρ ) + 1 − pρ ]] + 1Πt ′i ≥Πˆt ′wt
}
where V (Πt ′i ,G) = V (
Πt
′
i t
′ + 1
t ′ + 1 , Πˆ
t ′ ,wt ) and V (Πt ′i ,B) = V (
Πt
′
i t
′
t ′ + 1 , Πˆ
t ′ ,wt )
and ∀t ,wt = wT when the agent looks forward from time T
where the worker solves for optimal effort exertion probabilities
ϵ(Πt ′i ) for each possible reputation Πt
′
i ∈ {Πt
′}, and high effort is
only optimal at time t if V (Πt ′i ,G)(pH − pρ ) ≥ eρ (θ ).
If firms seek those workers who appear willing and able to exert
high effort upon being hired, their equilibrium strategy is to select a
reputation threshold Πˆt ′ = pH −∆t ′ when facing a worker with his-
tory length t ′ since the last wage update. ∆t ′ > 0 acts as the firm’s
optimistic forgiveness buffer, permitting a worker’s recent time t ′
reputation to be slightly under the pH threshold, to ensure that it
does not penalize workers who exert high effort but are unlucky
and receive B outcomes. An optimal choice of ∆t ′ monotonically
decreases in t ′ toward 0 as the reputation of a worker consistently
exerting high effort converges to pH as t ′ →∞. Note that the firm
must also take care not to decrease ∆t ′ too slowly, lest workers
are able to exert low effort and continue to be hired. Thus the firm
optimizes its hiring threshold Πˆt ′ = pH − ∆t ′ by decreasing ∆ just
enough at each time step to motivate consistent high effort from
workers who can afford it. All other workers exert low effort in each
round. Thus given a firm’s reputation threshold Πˆt ′ , its equilibrium
PLM hiring strategyHP is a mapping such that if and only if the
worker’s accumulated reputation since the last wage update Πt ′i
exceeds the threshold Πˆt ′ ,HP (Πt ′i ) = 1, and the worker is hired.
OtherwiseHP (Πt ′i ) = 0, and the worker does not earn the wage
premium. This strategy is summarized in the following Proposition,
and we defer the interested reader to the Appendix for its proof.
Proposition 1. There exists a pair of PLM equilibrium strategies
(H , E) of firm-hiring and worker-effort respectively such that
(i) A firm’s hiring strategyH is a selection of a reputation threshold
function of the form Πˆt
′
= pH − ∆t ′ , where ∆t ′ is a monoton-
ically decreasing function in t ′, such that H(Πt ′) = 1 if and
only if Πt
′
i ≥ Πˆt
′
, otherwiseH(i) = 0.
(ii) A worker’s effort strategy E is a selection of effort levels that
considers only the wagewt and cost of effort such that E(wt ) =
H if and only if eρ (θ ) ≤ wt (pH − pρ ), else E(wt ) = L.
Interestingly, the strategies employed in the repeated worker-
firm interactions in the PLM generate a recursive relationship of
the proportion of “good” workers for each group that mirrors the
structure of (1). PLM firms’ stringent threshold reputation hiring
strategy imposes the same type of “pressure” on workers at each
round of employment as does the single-shot game in the TLM. In
both labor markets, every outcome “counts.”
Having elaborated upon the dynamics of both the TLM and PLM,
we incorporate worker movement and combine the results to obtain
a recursive relationship that governs the sequence of workers’ per-
formance results from an initial wagew0. Note that the multiplicity
of possible firm hiring strategies produces a multiplicity of dynamic
paths of outcomes {(дµt ,дνt )}∞0 to steady-state, but given that in our
model, firms are willing to hire only and all workers who consis-
tently exert high effort, firm and worker equilibrium strategies are
as described in Proposition 1, there is a unique sequence of group
outcome pairs (дµt ,дνt ) such that there exists a time t = T with the
property that ∀t ≥ T , (дµT ,дνT ) = (д
µ
t ,д
ν
t ).
Theorem 3.1. Under the described labor market conditions in
which ℓ proportion of workers gain entry into the TLM and firms
abide by the statistical parity hiring constraint, the proportion of all
workers in group µ producing good outcomes at time t , дµt in the full
labor market follows the recursive system
д
µ
t+1 =pH [1 − F (θQ )γ
µ
t − F (θU )(1 − γ µt )] + pQ F (θQ )γ µt (2)
+ pU F (θU )(1 − γ µt )
where π µt =
σµ ℓ
τ
t∑
j=t−τ
д
µ
j , (3)
γ
µ
t = ϕ(η̂µ (π µt )), (4)
θρ = e
−1
ρ (wt (pH − pρ )), (5)
дt = σµ ℓд
µ
t + (1 − σµ )ℓдνt , (6)
where ϕ and η̂µ in Eq. 4 are monotonically increasing functions whose
composition combines the labor market’s reputational feedback effect
with firms’ TLM constrained group-investment thresholds. Then there
exists a unique stable symmetric steady-state equilibrium and conver-
gence time T , wherein π˜ µt = π˜
ν
t = π˜ ,∀t > T , satisfying system-wide
fairness, with a corresponding unique stable wage w˜ .
To understand why the existence of this unique stable symmet-
ric equilibrium is guaranteed when TLM firms are bound to the
statistical parity requirement, consider the two variables that affect
a group µ worker i’s likelihood of producing a good outcome: her
ability level θi and her probability of being qualified P(Q |ηˆµ ) = γ µ .
Since there are positive returns to investment, γ µ is increasing in
π µ : As her group µ social standing rises, cost conditions improve,
and as a result, workers in future generations are more likely to be
qualified. With the imposition of the TLM hiring constraint, firms
recognize the groups’ different costs of investment and hire in a
manner that retains equality between the two groups’ underlying
ability distributions F (θ ) within the labor market, which assures
that the proportions of workers producing good outcomes in each
group дµ do not diverge within the skilled labor market pipeline.
Moreover, the statistical parity hiring constraint requires that firms
hire in a manner such that workers from a disadvantaged group µ
are not inequitably blocked from entering the skilled labor market
and always constitute σµ ℓ of the TLM. As a result of maintaining
both identical ability distributions F (θ ) and proportional represen-
tation σµ in the TLM, statistical parity hiring ensures that as group
outcomes in the skilled labor market converge, so do group repu-
tations. Thus, the γt -generated positive feedback loop that pushes
towards diverging group outcomes is always constrained, allow-
ing the natural reputational feedback on group investment cost
functions cπ µ to drive the convergence of group outcomes and
thus group reputations to a single steady-state value. Importantly,
throughout the path of {(дµt ,дνt )} outcomes toward this symmetric
steady-state, the “severity” of the TLM fairness constraint on firms’
hiring strategies continually slackens until it recedes into disuse.
For a full exposition of the proof, see the Appendix.
Under statistical parity hiring in the TLM, groups with unequal
initial social standing will gradually approach the same reputation
level according to time-lag τ . The constraint has the effect of co-
opting the “self-confirming” loop for group reputation improvement—
collective reputation produces a positive externality, lowering indi-
vidual group members’ cost functions, thus improving investment
conditions for future workers, further raising individual and group
reputation. We point out that the empirically-validated link be-
tween group reputations and members’ investment costs makes
a TLM statistical parity constraint a more efficient means of ad-
dressing group inequalities than a similar intervention in the PLM.
Since the TLM represents the entry point into the market, enforcing
statistical parity at the onset ensures that lower reputation workers
are not disproportionately excluded from the pipeline as a whole.
We next compare this steady-state under the TLM constraint
with long-term outcomes of other rational hiring strategies that are
not bound by any fairness constraints and show that under partic-
ular market conditions, the fair steady-state is Pareto-dominant.
3.2 Comparative Statics with Unconstrained
Hiring Strategies
In the absence of any constraint, firms are free to select any strat-
egy that will maximize their probability of employing high-ability,
qualified workers. Two such common strategies are group-blind,
sometimes called “meritocratic,” and statistical discriminatory hir-
ing. We provide an overview of each practice and then continue
on to comparing their long-term equilibria outcomes with the sym-
metric steady-state that arises under our TLM hiring constraint.
Consider a group-blind TLM hiring strategy that is individual-
based, operating under an equal-treatment philosophy. Without
considering agent group membership— suppose again µ ∈ {B,W }—
the firm hires a proportion ℓ of workers by selecting a single in-
vestment level threshold η˜ for all workers, implicitly defined as
ℓ = (1 − σB )
(
1 − F (c−1πW (η˜(pH − pρ ))
)
+ σB
(
1 − F (c−1π B (η˜(pH − pρ ))
)
where σB and 1−σB give the proportion of individuals in groups B
andW respectively, and the function cπ µ (·) determines the group
µ investment level. Pragmatically under this strategy, the firm will
examine the broad distribution of all investment levels and select a
threshold above which it is willing to employ workers. This strategy
is also rationalized by the fact that the threshold η˜ maximizes the
expected number of hired workers who are qualified.
An alternative class of firm hiring strategies employ statistical
discrimination, in which priors regarding a worker’s observable
attributes, such as group membership, are used to infer a particular
individual’s hidden attributes. In particular, if TLM firms hold priors
ξB and ξW about the two groups’ capabilities, upon observing an
applicant’s group µ and investment level η, they will update their
beliefs of the prospective employee’s qualifications according to:
P(Q |µ,η) = pQ (η)ξµ
pQ (η)ξµ + (1 − ξµ )pU (η)
where pQ (η) and pU (η) give the probability of a qualified and un-
qualified worker having investment level η respectively.
Theorem 3.2. In a PLM with unsaturated demand (w = w¯) for
skilled workers, the TLM constraint leads to a symmetric steady-state
equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the asymmetric equilibria that
arise under group-blind and statistical discriminatory hiring.
We present an abbreviated exposition of the underlying factors
that drive unconstrained hiring strategies to Pareto-dominated
outcomes. For the full account of the proof, see the Appendix.
Group-blind hiring satisfies neither of the two key constrained
hiring guarantees described in the proof explanation for Theorem
3.1—namely, groups no longer share equal ability distributions F (θ )
nor are they proportionally represented in the market according to
their demographic shares σµ . The violation of both of these criteria
contribute to group reputation divergence and thus the existence
of persistent asymmetric outcomes between groups.
At the asymmetric steady-state, groups retain distinct invest-
ment costs that, under a group-blind investment threshold, generate
group-specific ability level thresholds θ˜B and θ˜W . If group reputa-
tion πB < πW , then these ability thresholds may be ranked with
respect to the threshold θ¯ that arises under the fairness constraint:
θ˜W < θ¯ < θ˜B . These hiring strategies inequitably bound the pro-
portion of able and qualified workers in group B who are eligible
to compete for skilled jobs, leaving behind an untapped source of
group B individuals who would have otherwise been hired. Under
PLM conditions in which demand for skilled workers is unsatu-
rated and the wagew(дt ) = w¯ , workers in groupW who are barred
from entering the labor market in the proposed fair regime are
not hired at equilibrium under group-blind hiring anyway. With
strictly better-off employment outcomes for group B workers and
no worse outcomes for groupW workers, the constrained-hiring
equilibrium Pareto-dominates the group-blind hiring equilibrium.
Similarly, statistical discriminatory hiring leads to group-specific
ability thresholds and does not guarantee statistical parity. As Coate
and Loury [21] show, self-confirming asymmetric equilibria also
exist under this regime, wherein lower investment levels within
the group with lower social standing are justified by firms’ more
stringent hiring standards. These effects have consequences that
mirror the Pareto-dominated results under group-blind hiring.
4 DISCUSSION
Describing disparate outcomes in employment as caused by rational
agent best response strategies suggests that the field of algorithmic
fairness should consider the labor market’s inherent dynamic set-
ting in its approach to potential interventions. Fairness constraints
that are conceived as isolated procedural checks have a limited
capacity to install system-wide fairness that is self-sustaining and
long-lasting. The problem of fairness in the labor market is fun-
damentally tied to historical factors. Within nearly all societal do-
mains in which fairness is an issue, past and current social relations
differentially impact subjects, producing distinct sets of resources,
options, and opportunities that continue to mark agents’ choices
and outcomes today. Empirical evidence points to what economist
and social theorist Glenn Loury has called “development bias,” in
which black members of society have reduced chances of realizing
their potential, as the greater source of racial inequality in welfare
outcomes than discriminatory hiring [? ]. This perspective chal-
lenges the notion that assuring “individual fairness” of the actual
procedure of hiring should be the primary concern in assuring a
labor market that is unbiased as a whole.
Not only is the standard learning theory formulation of the
problem, in which agent attributes are treated as a priori givens,
inadequate to attend to development bias, it also neglects the (ar-
guably) meritocratic goals of the labor market. In economic settings,
rewarding merit primarily serves an instrumental purpose—to in-
centivize investment and effort—rather than existing simply to pass
along desert-based awards to candidates. Framing the problem as
one of clustering or classification fails to understand the labor mar-
ket as an incentive-oriented system. Fairness criteria that solely
assess an algorithm’s treatment of workers’ qualifications similarly
fall into the trap of viewing hiring decisions only as rewards to
meritorious individuals without considering the incentive purposes
of the reward system at-large.
In contrast, a dynamic model recognizes the ripple effect of de-
velopment bias in the past and calls for a fairness intervention with
incentive features that carries momentum into the future. The labor
market as a source of economic opportunity is an ideal setting for a
notion of fairness that is oriented toward a future beyond the short
timeline of firm hiring cycles. It is precisely our focus on steady-
state outcomes that allows for this long-term conception of fairness.
However, it should be noted that the employment outcomes along
the path to the symmetric equilibrium are by no means guaranteed
to satisfy any notions of fairness, neither individual nor group. But
we claim that conceiving of fairness in this way—as a project that
aims to achieve permanent societal group-egalitarianism—is an
ambition that is not only a worthy goal in itself but also one that
we show may be economically socially optimal.
Our model of individual reputations as a sequence of previ-
ous outcomes in the PLM fits within the hiring regime today, in
which employers have increased access to worker data. Since algo-
rithms will be largely responsible for making sense of this historical
data, future work should consider how systems that sift through
a worker’s history should be designed to determine when group
membership-related considerations, such as the ones embedded in
the TLM constraint proposed here, should be taken into account.
As machine decision-makers are deployed increasingly throughout
hiring processes, we must grapple with a long tradition of explicit
and implicit human biases that have rendered the labor market
prone to discriminatory practices. We hope that this work can sug-
gest ways that algorithmic fairness interventions can shift these
hiring strategies towards contributing to a better, fairer future.
While this paper has shown that imposing the TLM hiring con-
straint ultimately leads to a group-symmetric outcome, we do not
claim that ours is the only intervention able to produce such an
equilibrium. The labor market pipeline in reality is an elaborate
sequence of agent choices and social stages that is much more com-
plex and heterogeneous than our model’s pre-TLM, TLM, and PLM
periods. The true space of possible policy interventions dwarfs
those considered in this work. Interventions aimed at reducing
the economic inequalities that exist between black and white com-
munities have been implemented at a variety of junctures in the
standard social pipeline, ranging from direct governmental subsidy
programs for childhood education costs in high-poverty areas to pri-
vate companies’ attempts at diversifying hiring by partnering with
historically black colleges. As such, there may exist a multiplicity
of intervention-types that all ultimately lead to group-egalitarian
outcomes. Further analysis of the costs and efficiencies associated
with each of these regimes will produce a richer understanding
of potential fairness interventions and their concomitant welfare
effects. Insofar as work in labor market fairness ought to inspire ac-
tion and policy in the real world, these open questions will require
both theoretical and empirical attention.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that the firm-set reputation threshold Πˆt ′ =
pH −∆t ′ , where t ′ is the time since the last wage update, enforces a
worker strategy of effort exertion akin to that of the one-shot game,
inwhich aworker exerts high effort if she can afford to do so and low
effort otherwise. The firm, by setting its reputation threshold ≈ pH ,
is correctly restricting its membership to workers who appear to
be consistently exerting high effort. By the Law of Large Numbers,
a worker’s recent time t ′ individual reputation Πt ′i → pH almost
surely as t ′ → ∞ as long as she continuously exerts high effort
at each time step. Moreover, since the relationship between effort
exertion and G or B outcomes can considered Bernoulli trials with
p = pH , we use the law of the iterated logarithm to bound individual
good workers’ reputational deviations away from the theoretical
mean pH as t increases and have that for all t = τ ,
|Πτ − Πˆτ | ≤
√
τ−1(2 ∗ 0.25log logτ ) (7)
Rubinstein and Yaari [? ] have shown that, for a similar setup of
imperfect observability and moral hazard in repeated interactions
between insurers and clients, the enforceability of the insurers’
strategies is dependent on the choice of the forgiveness buffer se-
quence. In our case, as long as ∆τ >
√
τ−1(0.5log logτ ) and the
sequence ∆t ′ → 0 monotonically, the Rubinstein-Yaari result car-
ries over into employment relationships, and workers will always
exert high effort when they can afford to do so. Importantly, our
scenario does differ from theirs in two ways: 1) Workers do not
stay in the labor market for an infinite number of rounds, 2) A
firm must pay the labor-market-wide wage upon hiring a worker
and cannot unilaterally deviate from the set price. Since workers
exit the market according to a Poisson parameter λ and the wage
premiumwt = w(дt ′) > 0 is set to always provide a higher payoff
for a worker than failing to be hired at all (due to the normaliza-
tion with respect to the unskilled job wage), the memoryless death
process ensures that a worker i with qualifications ρ will always
find it within her interest to pursue the skilled job as long as it is
individually rational for her to do so, i.e. eρ (θi ) ≤ wt (pH − pρ ).
Proof of Theorem 3.1
The TLM hiring constraint effects two guarantees: 1) It retains
the fundamental equality of groups’ ability level distributions F (θ )
within the labor market; 2) It results in statistical parity in the
proportion of workers offered skilled jobs in the TLM. Since the in-
stantaneous time t contributions to groups’ full population societal
reputations π µ are equivalent to дµ up to the same constant fac-
tor (ℓ proportion who enter the TLM), showing that the дµ values
converge is sufficient to show that group reputations π µ do as well.
Consider дt+1 = ξ (дt ) as a self-mapping ξ : X → X where X is
the unit interval [0, 1]. Groups µ and ν have the same functional
form of ξ differing only in a few particular parameters, which will
be addressed in the decomposition of ξ into two separate functions.
Assuming the two groups begin with unequal societal reputations,
we suppose that (without loss of generality) πν < πµ . We want to
show that regardless of initial values πν0 < π
µ
0 , hiring outcomes
will converge to achieve equal group outcomes system-wide under
labor market dynamics with the TLM fairness constraint.
Due to effect 1) of the TLM hiring constraint and the fact that
both groups experience the same labor-market-wide wagew(дt ),
the PLM ability thresholds θ̂Q and θ̂U are also equivalent across
groups. Thus the difference between the дµt and дνt arises due to the
different corresponding proportions of qualified workers γ νt < γ
µ
t
at time t . As such, we construct the function ϕ as a mapping of
γt ∈ [0, 1] to дt+1 ∈ [0, 1], such that дt+1 = ϕ(γt ). The function ϕ
is generic across the two groups, and group differences are entirely
encoded in the distinct inputs γ µt and γ νt .
Let’s call дµt+1 = ϕ(γ
µ
t ) and дνt+1 = ϕ(γ νt ), where we treat γ µ and
γ ν as distinct points of the mapping ϕ. Then, we have
д
µ
t+1 =pH [1 − F (θ̂Q )γ
µ
t − F (θ̂U )(1 − γ µt )] + pQ F (θ̂Q )γ µt (8)
+ pU F (θ̂U )(1 − γ µt )
The difference |дµt+1 − дνt+1 | is thus equivalent to the following
|ϕ(γ µt )−ϕ(γ νt )| = | − pH F (θ̂Q )(γ µt − γ νt ) + pH F (θ̂U )(γ µt − γ νt )
+ pQ F (θ̂Q )(γ µt − γ νt ) − pU F (θ̂U )(γ µt − γ νt )|
= (γ µt − γ νt )|pH [F (θ̂U ) − F (θ̂Q )] + pQ F (θ̂Q ) − pU F (θ̂U )|
We rewrite the quantity inside the absolute value:
| F (θ̂U )[pH − pU ]︸              ︷︷              ︸
∈(0,1)
+ F (θ̂Q )[pQ − pH ]︸              ︷︷              ︸
∈(−1,0)
| = |ϵt | < 1
Together, |дµt+1−дνt+1 | = |ϕ(γ
µ
t )−ϕ(γ νt )| ≤ |ϵt |(γ µt −γ νt ), ∀γ µt ,γ νt ∈
[0, 1], and with the bound on ϵ , ϕ is a contraction mapping.
Since group reputation considers the proportion of all members
in a group who are producing good outcomes, statistical parity
also has the upshot that a particular instantaneous time t group
reputation π µ exactly scales withдµ as each group is proportionally
represented within the labor market according to its population-
wide demographic share, so we need only consider дµt values to
determine the feedback loop property of collective reputation π µt
and group cost functions cµ and cν . Thus, the mappingψ : X → X ,
which maps normalized дt+1 ∈ X = [0, 1] to γt+1 ∈ X = [0, 1] such
that γt+1 = ψ (дt+1), is a weakly contracting map.
We can now rewrite the recursive system дt+1 = ξ (дt ) as a
composition: дt+1 = ξ (дt ) = ϕ(ψ (дt )), where we have shown that
ϕ is a contraction andψ is a short map. Then their composition ξ ,
which represents the recursive self-map determining the evolution
of group-wide employment outcomes, is also a contraction map.
Then by the Banach Fixed Point Theorem, there is a unique
fixed-point д˜ = ξ (д˜) such that all initial points дi ∈ [0, 1] converge
to д˜ via a sequence of applications of the recursive relation ξ as
in (8): For any two group reputations π µ and πν corresponding to
initial points дµ0 and д
ν
0 , there exists a T such that ∀t > T ,π µt =
πνt = π˜ (similarly with дµ ). At equilibrium, there is a unique wage
w˜ corresponding to д˜, and the system admits group fairness. □
Proof of Theorem 3.2
To show that the contraction and convergence assured by sta-
tistical parity hiring is not guaranteed under group-blind hiring,
note that when πB < πW , necessarily 1 − F (θ˜B ) < 1 − F (θ˜W ), and
the composition of workers granted entry into the TLM does not
satisfy statistical parity. We call the proportion of workers in the
TLM belonging to groups B andW , kB and 1 − kB respectively.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we decompose дµt into the
feed-forward labor market flow effect and the feedback natural
reputational effect. However, since γ µ for the two groups are the
same, and F (θ˜µ ) values differ, we instead write labor market flow
as a function of F (θ˜µ ), call it ϕ6.
Then дWt+1 = ϕ(F (θ˜Q )) and дBt+1 = ϕ(F (θ˜B )), and
|ϕ(F (θ˜Q )) − ϕ(F (θ˜B ))| = (F (θ˜B ) − F (θ˜Q ))γ (pH − pQ )
Since γ (pH − pQ ) < 1, ϕ thus also contracts in the feed-forward
mechanism, however the function only captures the proportional
д
µ
t dynamics from the TLM into the PLM, which does not scale
with group reputation π µ since statistical parity is not guaranteed.
Instead, under group-blind hiring, group reputation, which captures
the proportion of all workers in the group who are producing
good outcomes in the skilled labor, is a function of kB , or the
bottleneck of group proportionality created by the group-blind
investment threshold. Thus the particular time t normalized group
societal reputation πBt ∝
kBдBt
σB < д
B
t and πWt ∝
(1−kB )дWt
1−σB > д
W
t ,
and as a result, |πWt − πBt | > |дWt+1 − дBt+1 |. Since the mapping
from дµt → π µt is not a contraction, the reputation feedback is
not guaranteed to contract either. The system may thus reach an
6Note that in this proof, we also assume that θ˜B < θ˜U , but the proof carries through
in the exact same manner when this is not true.
asymmetric equilibrium in which groups B andW maintain distinct
investment costs and equal group reputations are never recovered.
We now show that this asymmetric outcome is Pareto-dominated
by the hiring constraint-produced symmetric steady-state when
PLM firms’ demand for workers is not saturated and w(д˜t ) = w¯ .
For the two groups, B andW , group-blind hiring imposes a sin-
gle investment threshold η˜ such that hired workers in both labor
markets have the same probability of being qualified regardless
of group membership: γ µ = γ ν = γ . Suppose group reputations
are not equal as in the case of the group-blind asymmetric equi-
librium just proven, then group-blind hiring results in effective
ability thresholds that may be ranked with respect to the threshold
θ¯ under statistical parity hiring. If πB < πW , then θ˜W < θ¯ < θ˜B .
Note that throughout the paper, it is assumed that not all workers
in the TLM are able to be hired in the PLM; therefore the ability
threshold for exerting on-the-job effort is greater than the ability
threshold resulting from the investment threshold under statistical
parity-constrained hiring: θ̂Q > θ¯ .
When θ̂Q < θ˜B , then TLM group-blind hiring leaves behind high
ability workers in group B who would have otherwise been hired in
the PLM. In particular, all qualified workers in group B with ability
level θ ∈ [θ̂Q , θ˜B ) are only hired in the fairness constrained equilib-
rium; under group-blind hiring, they are barred from entering the
TLM. This result accords with the vicious circle of the asymmetric
equilibrium, since the reputation gap |πBt − πWt | and consequently,
differences in group investment costs are maintained.
Further, since 1 − Fд(θ̂ρ ) < 1 − Ff (θ̂ρ ) where Fд and Ff are
the ability CDFs under the group-blind and fair regime respec-
tively, in a labor market that demands more workers yet cannot
sustain a higher wage (w˜ = w)7, firms strictly prefer the steady-
state equilibrium under the fairness constraint. This is because the
effective higher ability threshold for group B under the group-blind
TLM strategy is inefficient, leaving behind an untapped resource
of skilled and qualified individuals in group B who would have
otherwise been hired in the PLM. Even those workers in groupW
with ability level θ ∈ [θ˜W , θ̂Q ) who are only allowed to enter the
TLM in the group-blind regime do not fare better, since all such
workers have ability level lower than the PLM reputation threshold
and are not hired at equilibrium anyway. Thus since some work-
ers in group B are strictly better off and workers in groupW no
worse off, the asymmetric equilibria under group-blind hiring is
Pareto-dominated by the symmetric one of the fair case.
The proof of this result for the statistical discriminatory hiring
regime follows similarly. If ξW > ξB , then P(Q |W ,η) > P(Q |B,η),
and the groups face different incentive compatibility constraints.
Self-confirming asymmetric equilibria also exist under this regime
[21], and using the same argument about lost efficiency due to in-
equitable ability thresholds in the TLM for group B, these equilibria
are also Pareto-dominated by hiring that abides by statistical parity.
7There are a variety of reasons why an association of firms that demand more workers
would be unable or unwilling to raise its wage higher w˜ = w : A higher wage may
encourage lower ability workers to apply and exert effort, and in reality, probabilities
of success pH may be variable according to ability; thus the firm may want to a priori
exclude such workers. Wage caps may also result from firm-firm collusion on price.
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